I am not much of walker

es esmu slikts kājāmgājējs

noun (a person who goes walking for pleasure: We met a party of walkers as we were going home.) caminhante

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[w'ɔ:kə] n 1 passeador, andador, caminhador, pedestre. I am not much of walker / eu não sou muito amigo de caminhadas. 2 ave andadora. 3 andador (de bebê).

{'wɔ:kə}
1. пешеходец
2. човек, който обича да се разхожда
I am not much of a WALKER не издържам много на ходене
3. проходилка за дете
4. помощно приспособление за ходене (за инвалид)

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{'wъ:kъ} n 1. пешеходец; 2. човек, който обича да се разхожда;

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n пешеходец; човек, който се разхожда;walker; n 1. пешеходец; 2. човек, който обича да се разхожда; I am not much of a walker не

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walker[´wɔ:kə] n 1. пешеходец; човек, който се разхожда; I am not much of a \walker не издържам много на път; 2. паяк, датска проходилка (и baby \walker).

I

(Walker)

interjection slang

врешь!, не может быть!

II

1) ходок; I am not much of a walker я плохой ходок

2) sport скороход

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(n) валяльщик; обувь для ходьбы; скороход; сукновал; торговец вразнос; ходок; ходунок

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ходок

ходунок

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[ˈwɔ:kə]

Walker int sl врешь!, не может быть! walker: walker спорт. скороход Walker ходок; I am not much of a walker я плохой ходок

Walker int sl врешь!, не может быть! walker: walker спорт. скороход ~ ходок;
I am not much of a walker я плохой ходок

int розм.

не може бути!, не бреши! (тж Hookey Walker)

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int брешеш!, бути не може! ( Hookey walker)

1) див. walk II -f -er

2) швидкий

3) cпopт. скороход, швидкий

4) ходунок ( для дитини або інвалід)

5) торговець, який розносить товари

6) взуття для ходьби

int брешеш!, бути не може! ( Hookey walker)

1) див. walk II -f -er

2) швидкий

3) cпopт. скороход, швидкий

4) ходунок ( для дитини або інвалід)

5) торговець, який розносить товари

6) взуття для ходьби

[ˈwɔ:kə]

walker ходок; I am not much of a walker я плохой ходок moon walker = moon rover

1) хода́к

2) спорт. скорохо́д

   1) Grammar as Analogous to a Scientific Theory

   I think that the failure to offer a precise account of the notion "grammar" is not just a superficial defect in linguistic theory that can be remedied by adding one more definition. It seems to me that until this notion is clarified, no part of linguistic theory can achieve anything like a satisfactory development.... I have been discussing a grammar of a particular language here as analogous to a particular scientific theory, dealing with its subject matter (the set of sentences of this language) much as embryology or physics deals with its subject matter. (Chomsky, 1964, p. 213)

   2) Native Speakers and Their Grammar

   Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of grammar or even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge of his language are necessarily accurate. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 8)

   3) The Reduction of Transformation Rules In a Science of Grammar

   Much effort has been devoted to showing that the class of possible transformations can be substantially reduced without loss of descriptive power through the discovery of quite general conditions that all such rules and the representations they operate on and form must meet.... [The] transformational rules, at least for a substantial core grammar, can be reduced to the single rule, "Move alpha" (that is, "move any category anywhere"). (Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 21)

   4) The Relationship of Transformational Grammar to Semantics and to Human Performance

   he implications of assuming a semantic memory for what we might call "generative psycholinguistics" are: that dichotomous judgments of semantic well-formedness versus anomaly are not essential or inherent to language performance; that the transformational component of a grammar is the part most relevant to performance models; that a generative grammar's role should be viewed as restricted to language production, whereas sentence understanding should be treated as a problem of extracting a cognitive representation of a text's message; that until some theoretical notion of cognitive representation is incorporated into linguistic conceptions, they are unlikely to provide either powerful language-processing programs or psychologically relevant theories.

   Although these implications conflict with the way others have viewed the relationship of transformational grammars to semantics and to human performance, they do not eliminate the importance of such grammars to psychologists, an importance stressed in, and indeed largely created by, the work of Chomsky. It is precisely because of a growing interdependence between such linguistic theory and psychological performance models that their relationship needs to be clarified. (Quillian, 1968, p. 260)

   5) The Terminologies of Formal Grammar

   here are some terminological distinctions that are crucial to explain, or else confusions can easily arise. In the formal study of grammar, a language is defined as a set of sentences, possibly infinite, where each sentence is a string of symbols or words. One can think of each sentence as having several representations linked together: one for its sound pattern, one for its meaning, one for the string of words constituting it, possibly others for other data structures such as the "surface structure" and "deep structure" that are held to mediate the mapping between sound and meaning. Because no finite system can store an infinite number of sentences, and because humans in particular are clearly not pullstring dolls that emit sentences from a finite stored list, one must explain human language abilities by imputing to them a grammar, which in the technical sense is a finite rule system, or programme, or circuit design, capable of generating and recognizing the sentences of a particular language. This "mental grammar" or "psychogrammar" is the neural system that allows us to speak and understand the possible word sequences of our native tongue. A grammar for a specific language is obviously acquired by a human during childhood, but there must be neural circuitry that actually carries out the acquisition process in the child, and this circuitry may be called the language faculty or language acquisition device. An important part of the language faculty is universal grammar, an implementation of a set of principles or constraints that govern the possible form of any human grammar. (Pinker, 1996, p. 263)

   6) The Theory of Grammar

   A grammar of language L is essentially a theory of L. Any scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs.... Similarly a grammar of English is based on a finite corpus of utterances (observations), and it will contain certain grammatical rules (laws) stated in terms of the particular phonemes, phrases, etc., of English (hypothetical constructs). These rules express structural relations among the sentences of the corpus and the infinite number of sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus (predictions). (Chomsky, 1957, p. 49)

   1) The Science of Logic Finds Ordinary Language to Be an Obstacle

   My initial step... was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inference free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way, I found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle. (Frege, 1972, p. 104)

   2) Logic Is a Microscope

   I believe I can make the relation of my 'conceptual notation' to ordinary language clearest if I compare it to the relation of the microscope to the eye. The latter, because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the microscope. Of course, viewed as an optical instrument it reveals many imperfections, which usually remain unnoticed only because of its intimate connection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate.... Similarly, this 'conceptual notation' is devised for particular scientific purposes; and therefore one may not condemn it because it is useless for other purposes. (Frege, 1972, pp. 104-105)

   3) Logic Carries on an Unceasing Struggle with Psychology

   To sum up briefly, it is the business of the logician to conduct an unceasing struggle against psychology and those parts of language and grammar which fail to give untrammeled expression to what is logical. He does not have to answer the question: How does thinking normally take place in human beings? What course does it naturally follow in the human mind? What is natural to one person may well be unnatural to another. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)

   4) Logic Should Replace the Ordinary Language of Everyday Discourse

   We are very dependent on external aids in our thinking, and there is no doubt that the language of everyday life-so far, at least, as a certain area of discourse is concerned-had first to be replaced by a more sophisticated instrument, before certain distinctions could be noticed. But so far the academic world has, for the most part, disdained to master this instrument. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)

   5) Logic Is Unnatural

   There is no reproach the logician need fear less than the reproach that his way of formulating things is unnatural.... If we were to heed those who object that logic is unnatural, we would run the risk of becoming embroiled in interminable disputes about what is natural, disputes which are quite incapable of being resolved within the province of logic. (Frege, 1979, p. 128)

   6) The Significance of " Baby Logic" for Linguistics

   [L]inguists will be forced, internally as it were, to come to grips with the results of modern logic. Indeed, this is apparently already happening to some extent. By "logic" is not meant here recursive function-theory, California model-theory, constructive proof-theory, or even axiomatic settheory. Such areas may or may not be useful for linguistics. Rather under "logic" are included our good old friends, the homely locutions "and," "or," "if-then," "if and only if," "not," "for all x," "for some x," and "is identical with," plus the calculus of individuals, event-logic, syntax, denotational semantics, and... various parts of pragmatics.... It is to these that the linguist can most profitably turn for help. These are his tools. And they are "clean tools," to borrow a phrase of the late J. L. Austin in another context, in fact, the only really clean ones we have, so that we might as well use them as much as we can. But they constitute only what may be called "baby logic." Baby logic is to the linguist what "baby mathematics" (in the phrase of Murray Gell-Mann) is to the theoretical physicist-very elementary but indispensable domains of theory in both cases. (Martin, 1969, pp. 261-262)

   7) The Existence of a Mental Logic Denied

   There appears to be no branch of deductive inference that requires us to assume the existence of a mental logic in order to do justice to the psychological phenomena. To be logical, an individual requires, not formal rules of inference, but a tacit knowledge of the fundamental semantic principle governing any inference; a deduction is valid provided that there is no way of interpreting the premises correctly that is inconsistent with the conclusion. Logic provides a systematic method for searching for such counter-examples. The empirical evidence suggests that ordinary individuals possess no such methods. (Johnson-Laird, quoted in Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 130)

   8) The Fundamental Paradox of Logic

   The fundamental paradox of logic [that "there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves" (Russell to Frege, 16 June 1902, in van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 125)] is with us still, bequeathed by Russell-by way of philosophy, mathematics, and even computer science-to the whole of twentieth-century thought. Twentieth-century philosophy would begin not with a foundation for logic, as Russell had hoped in 1900, but with the discovery in 1901 that no such foundation can be laid. (Everdell, 1997, p. 184)

SUBJECT AREA: Ports and shipping

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From 1844 until 1962, the Clyde shipyard of William Denny and Brothers, Dumbarton, produced over 1,500 ships, trained innumerable students of all nationalities in shipbuilding and marine engineering, and for the seventy-plus years of their existence were accepted worldwide as the leaders in the application of science to ship design and construction. Until the closure of the yard members of the Denny family were among the partners and later directors of the firm: they included men as distinguished as Dr Peter Denny (1821(?)–95), Sir Archibald Denny (1860–1936) and Sir Maurice Denny (1886– 1955), the main collaborator in the design of the Denny-Brown ship stabilizer.

One of the most influential of this shipbuilding family was William Denny, now referred to as William 3! His early education was at Dumbarton, then on Jersey and finally at the Royal High School, Edinburgh, before he commenced an apprenticeship at his father's shipyard. From the outset he not only showed great aptitude for learning and hard work but also displayed an ability to create good relationships with all he came into contact with. At the early age of 21 he was admitted a partner of the shipbuilding business of William Denny and Brothers, and some years later also of the associated engineering firm of Denny \& Co. His deep-felt interest in what is now known as industrial relations led him in 1871 to set up a piecework system of payment in the shipyard. In this he was helped by the Yard Manager, Richard Ramage, who later was to found the Leith shipyard, which produced the world's most elegant steam yachts. This research was published later as a pamphlet called The Worth of Wages, an unusual and forward-looking action for the 1860s, when Denny maintained that an absentee employer should earn as much contempt and disapproval as an absentee landlord! In 1880 he initiated an awards scheme for all company employees, with grants and awards for inventions and production improvements. William Denny was not slow to impose new methods and to research naval architecture, a special interest being progressive ship trials with a view to predicting effective horsepower. In time this led to his proposal to the partners to build a ship model testing tank beside the Dumbarton shipyard; this scheme was completed in 1883 and was to the third in the world (after the Admiralty tank at Torquay, managed by William Froude and the Royal Netherlands Navy facility at Amsterdam, under B.J. Tideman. In 1876 the Denny Shipyard started work with mild-quality shipbuilding steel on hulls for the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, and in 1879 the world's first two ships of any size using this weight-saving material were produced: they were the Rotomahana for the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand and the Buenos Ayrean for the Allan Line of Glasgow. On the naval-architecture side he was involved in Denny's proposals for standard cross curves of stability for all ships, which had far-reaching effects and are now accepted worldwide. He served on the committee working on improvements to the Load Line regulations and many other similar public bodies. After a severe bout of typhoid and an almost unacceptable burden of work, he left the United Kingdom for South America in June 1886 to attend to business with La Platense Flotilla Company, an associate company of William Denny and Brothers. In March the following year, while in Buenos Aires, he died by his own hand, a death that caused great and genuine sadness in the West of Scotland and elsewhere.

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SUBJECT AREA: Ports and shipping, Steam and internal combustion engines

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John was the third son of David Elder. The father came from a family of millwrights and moved to Glasgow where he worked for the well-known shipbuilding firm of Napier's and was involved with improving marine engines. John was educated at Glasgow High School and then for a while at the Department of Civil Engineering at Glasgow University, where he showed great aptitude for mathematics and drawing. He spent five years as an apprentice under Robert Napier followed by two short periods of activity as a pattern-maker first and then a draughtsman in England. He returned to Scotland in 1849 to become Chief Draughtsman to Napier, but in 1852 he left to become a partner with the Glasgow general engineering company of Randolph Elliott \& Co. Shortly after his induction (at the age of 28), the engineering firm was renamed Randolph Elder \& Co.; in 1868, when the partnership expired, it became known as John Elder \& Co. From the outset Elder, with his partner, Charles Randolph, approached mechanical (especially heat) engineering in a rigorous manner. Their knowledge and understanding of entropy ensured that engine design was not a hit-and-miss affair, but one governed by recognition of the importance of the new kinetic theory of heat and with it a proper understanding of thermodynamic principles, and by systematic development. In this Elder was joined by W.J.M. Rankine, Professor of Civil Engineering and Mechanics at Glasgow University, who helped him develop the compound marine engine. Elder and Randolph built up a series of patents, which guaranteed their company's commercial success and enabled them for a while to be the sole suppliers of compound steam reciprocating machinery. Their first such engine at sea was fitted in 1854 on the SS Brandon for the Limerick Steamship Company; the ship showed an improved performance by using a third less coal, which he was able to reduce still further on later designs.

Elder developed steam jacketing and recognized that, with higher pressures, triple-expansion types would be even more economical. In 1862 he patented a design of quadruple-expansion engine with reheat between cylinders and advocated the importance of balancing reciprocating parts. The effect of his improvements was to greatly reduce fuel consumption so that long sea voyages became an economic reality.

His yard soon reached dimensions then unequalled on the Clyde where he employed over 4,000 workers; Elder also was always interested in the social welfare of his labour force. In 1860 the engine shops were moved to the Govan Old Shipyard, and again in 1864 to the Fairfield Shipyard, about 1 mile (1.6 km) west on the south bank of the Clyde. At Fairfield, shipbuilding was commenced, and with the patents for compounding secure, much business was placed for many years by shipowners serving long-distance trades such as South America; the Pacific Steam Navigation Company took up his ideas for their ships. In later years the yard became known as the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Ltd, but it remains today as one of Britain's most efficient shipyards and is known now as Kvaerner Govan Ltd.

In 1869, at the age of only 45, John Elder was unanimously elected President of the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland; however, before taking office and giving his eagerly awaited presidential address, he died in London from liver disease. A large multitude attended his funeral and all the engineering shops were silent as his body, which had been brought back from London to Glasgow, was carried to its resting place. In 1857 Elder had married Isabella Ure, and on his death he left her a considerable fortune, which she used generously for Govan, for Glasgow and especially the University. In 1883 she endowed the world's first Chair of Naval Architecture at the University of Glasgow, an act which was reciprocated in 1901 when the University awarded her an LLD on the occasion of its 450th anniversary.

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RLH / FMW